European Economic and Monetary Union and Foreign Direct Investment: a Survey of the Theoretical and Impirical Literature. by Giovanna SEGRE
 
European Economic and Monetary Union and Foreign Direct 














Center for Economic Studies 




March 2000 European Economic and Monetary Union and
Foreign Direct Investment: A Survey of the
Theoretical and Empirical Literature
Giovanna Segre*
* University of Torino, Economics Department, Via Po 53, I-10124 Torino. Phone: 0039-
011-6702707. Email: segre@master.de.unito.it. This paper was prepared while I was a
visiting student at the CES, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. I wish to thank Giuseppe
Bertola and Paul De Grauwe for helpful suggestions and comments.Index
1 Introduction 1
2 Theoretical framework 2
2.1 Theory of multinationals 3
2.2 New trade theory 5
2.2.1 Horizontal multinational models 6
2.2.2 Vertical multinational models 8
2.2.3 Other models 10
3 FDI and European Economic Union 12
3.1 Stylised facts 13
3.2 Limits of the early literature 17
3.3 Improvements of the recent literature 19
3.3.1 Intensity and direction of the effects on FDI 22
3.3.2 Effects on the geographical distribution of FDI 24
3.3.3 Country and sector specificity of the effects on FDI 26
3.3.4 Other important factors behind the effects on FDI 28
4 FDI and European Monetary Union 31
4.1 The literature on FDI and monetary union 31




Although the theoretical and empirical literature on foreign direct
investment (FDI) and multinational corporations
1 is relatively abundant, it
still fails to provide an adequate explication of these phenomena. The very
complexity of the issue has produced a multitude of research efforts
suggesting various explanatory hypotheses and models. This vast literature
has been surveyed several times
2. Within the context of the literature on
FDI, we will focus on studies that analyse possible links between FDI and
the European Economic and Monetary Union.
Since 1980 the importance of FDI stocks to the EU as a share of GDP has
risen significantly. Moreover, FDI appears to be more relevant in the EU
economy than in other economies around the world, especially developed
countries. In general, the past decade has seen a remarkable transformation
in trade and direct investment flows. This transformation has been
characterised by a particularly rapid growth of FDI. Over the period 1983-
89, the outflows of FDI grew at an annual rate of approximately 2 percent,
more than twice as fast as the previous decade and tree times faster that the
growth of world exports and the growth of world output. There is an
intensified effort on the part of most countries to attract this investment.
Multinational companies are emerging from the developing countries as
well as the developed economies. This implies that FDI is likely to become
the dominant method for international economic integration and that
multinational firms will produce an increasing share of world output. It
might be felt that this is of little consequence since, in a Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson context, trade in factors of production can be treated as a
substitute for trade in goods, but the generality of this proposition can be
questioned. In an imperfectly competitive international economic
                                                                
1  Foreign direct investment indicates both cross-border mergers and acquisitions of existing firms and
a greenfield investment. Multinational corporations are the main source of FDI. The two expressions
will be used indifferently.2
environment, the relationship between trade in goods and trade in factors is
at best ambiguous. It is possible, and indeed likely as in particular Markusen
(1984, 1995, 1997) has suggested, that international factor flows are
complementary to trade in goods in both welfare and in volume-of-trade
sense. Parallel work in 1980’s focused, on the contrary, mainly on how the
operations of multinational companies differed from portfolio capital flows
in a traditional neoclassical general-equilibrium model. According to
Markusen (1997), trade theory continues indeed to be heavily influenced by
the ideas first put forward by Mundell (1957), that international trade in
goods and trade in factors are substitutes. However, the main conclusion of
recent works is that trade and FDI are complementary flows.
In order to understand how economic and monetary integration may exert an
impact on multinational activities and FDI, it is necessary to understand the
underlying forces affecting the decisions of multinational firms. A brief
review of the theoretical framework developed by the literature focusing on
multinational enterprises is therefore presented in Sections 2. Sections 3 and
4 are dedicated to review the literature on FDI related with the themes of
European economic integration and European Monetary Union. Section 5
concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
The theoretical framework developed by the literature on FDI can be
divided in two successive approaches. The traditional theory of
multinational enterprises has been the most important framework for
research on this field, until the recent development of the so-called new
trade theory. A brief review of the traditional theory of multinationals and of
the more recent models of the new trade theory is presented in the next two
sections.
                                                                                                                                                                    
2  Among others, see Rugman (1986) for the early literature and Markusen (1995) for the
more recent developments.3
Theory of multinationals
The theory of multinational firms has a long history. The work most often
cited as seminal is the 1959 doctoral dissertation of Stephen Hymer,
published posthumously in 1976. Hymer first articulated the now widely
accepted notion that a firm whose operations cross national and cultural
boundaries faces costs that a firm whose operations are limited to one nation
does not. For a firm to overcome the presumed penalties posed by these
extra-costs, it must possess internal, firm-specific advantages over its rivals.
He considered that such advantages are mainly represented by economies of
scale or of superior production technology. A second very influential early
work was that of John Dunning (1958). By an empirical analysis of the
manufacturing operations in the United Kingdom controlled by US-based
firms, Dunning seemed to confirm many of Hymer’s speculations, although
the work by Dunning was done quite independently of Hymer’s work. The
author found that these operations generally paid higher wages and were
characterised by higher rates of labour productivity and new product
innovation than their UK-controlled rivals.
Many of the works since Hymer (1976) and Dunning (1958) have attempted
to identify the firm-specific advantages that drive FDI. The interpretation of
the motivation for FDI suggested by Buckley and Casson (1976), has since
become in general the standard point of departure. The authors observed
that when multinational enterprises decide to service non-home-nation
markets via direct investment there must exist some “internalisation”
advantage over other alternative modes of doing business, as exporting or
licensing. There must be economies associated with a firm exploiting a
market opportunity through internal operations. These economies might be
associated with costs of contract enforcement or of maintenance of quality
or other standards. Dunning (1988) has emphasised that the advantages of4
internalisation must interact with both firm-specific and locational
advantages to explain FDI. In his works, in order to combine the available
evidence, the author developed what is known in the literature as “OLI
paradigm”. The OLI framework, or “eclectic theory” as John Dunning has
dubbed it, has been widely considered, so that theoretical and empirical
investigations of the multinational enterprise are very often conducted with
reference to this framework.
According to Dunning (1988), the principal hypothesis on which the OLI
paradigm of international production is based is that a firm will engage in
foreign value-adding activities if and when three conditions are satisfied.
First, the firm should posses net ownership (O) advantages vis-à-vis a firm
of other nationalities in serving particular markets. These  ownership
advantages largely take the form of possession of intangible assets or of the
advantages of common governance which are exclusive or specific to the
firm possessing them. Second, it must be more beneficial to the enterprise
possessing these advantages to use them or their output itself, rather than to
sell or lease them to foreign firm. These advantages are called
internalisation (I) advantages. Assuming the first two conditions are
satisfied, it must be in the global interests of the enterprise to utilise these
advantages in conjunction with at least some factor inputs (including natural
resources) outside its home country. These advantages are termed the
locational (L) advantages of countries. Locational considerations should
mandate that the firm not concentrate all operations in one country serving
foreign markets entirely by exports and domestic markets by domestic
production.
A more recent development has been the attempt to embed theories of FDI
in formal models of international trade, as it will presented in the next
section.5
2.2 New trade theory
The theory of the multinational enterprise has tended to be a branch of a
more general theory of the firm, focusing on individual firms and their
incentives to internally integrate activities across geographic space. The
theory of the multinational enterprise has traditionally been rather disjoint
from the theory of international trade. International trade theory developed
from a general-equilibrium tradition usually relies on the twin assumption of
constant return to scale and perfect competition.
During the last fifteen years, the theory of international trade has broadened
considerably.  The result of this is the so-called new trade theory, which
indicates the industrial-organisation approach to trade. This approach has
enriched the understanding of the causes and consequences of trade by
adding elements of increasing returns to scale, imperfect competition, and
product differentiation to the more traditional comparative-advantage
models of international trade. According to the widely quoted Markusen
(1995) review article, trade and gains from trade arise independently of any
pattern of comparative advantage because firms achieve scale economies
and pursue strategies of product differentiation in an imperfect competitive
market.
The early attempts to reconcile the theory of multinational firms with trade
theory include the works of Helpman (1984) and of Markusen (1984) about
multinational enterprises generated by multiplant scale economies. The
models proposed by the authors are general equilibrium models built in
order to introduce explicitly multinational corporations in the general
equilibrium theories of international trade. A general equilibrium theory
appears indeed to be essential in order to connect systematically direct
investment to its fundamental determinants and so understand the relation
between standard international trade theory and the multinational firm.6
Helpman (1984) and Markusen (1984) are both primarily concerned to link
their treatments of direct investment to the theory of international trade, not
to the OLI framework. The former focuses on vertical investments in which
the production process is decomposed by stages according to the factor
intensities, and doesn’t consider investment to take place between similar
countries. This characteristic of the Helpman’s model is, however, counter
to empirical evidence. The latter focuses on horizontal investments
describing, in a general equilibrium system, the conditions under which
firms choose to become multinational, but eliminates any consideration of
vertical specialisation. In both cases, firms are supposed to export the
services of firm-specific assets to foreign production facilities, and it is not
very clear from this early work how such flows differ from the flow of
physical factors of production.
More recently, a large literature has been focusing on the attempt to
endogenize multinational enterprises into general equilibrium trade models.
Firm-level characteristics have been combined with country-level
characteristics and trade costs to determine what types of firms exist in
equilibrium. According to Markusen et al. (1996), two branches of literature
principally remain separate, one extending the model of horizontal
multinationals first developed by Markusen (1984) and the other extending
the vertical model first developed by Helpman (1984). Following Brainard
(1993a), it is possible to classify the same literature looking at the extent to
which multinational production-location decisions can be explained by the
trade-off between maximising proximity to customers and concentrating
production to exploit economies of scale.
2.2.1 Horiz ontal multinational models
In the first branch considered by Markusen et al. (1996), multinationals are
multiplant firms producing approximately identical products in different
locations and substituting international production for trade as in the7
horizontal model of Markusen (1984). In particular, Markusen (1984)
focuses on a multinational monopoly with one plant in each of two countries
versus a duopoly between two single-plant firms, but no attempt is made to
establish which is the equilibrium market structure. A first generalisation
with partially endogenized market structure is presented by Horstmann and
Markusen (1987). A model in which market structure is determined fully
endogenously as the outcome of plant location decision by firms, is
developed by the same authors in Horstmann and Markusen (1992). Other
generalisations are proposed by Brainard (1993a) and in the recent works by
Markusen and Venables (1996, 1998). Brainard (1993a) formalises a model
that provides a rationale for two-way horizontal expansion across border,
which is distinct from the traditional rationale for vertical expansion based
on factor endowment differential. The model introduces a trade-off between
proximity and concentration advantages as the basic strategic consideration
for the decision of a firm to go multinational, even in the absence of factor
price differentials. The equilibrium depicted by Brainard’s model is that
overseas production is more likely to occur the stronger are returns to scale
at the firm level relative to the plant-specific ones, the higher are transport
costs, the greater is expenditure on differentiated goods in the foreign
market, and the higher is the elasticity of substitution between varieties.
Moreover, Brainard (1993b, 1997), on the basis of a 1989 cross-section of
data for US bilateral activity, demonstrates that affiliate production rises as
a share of the sum of exports and affiliate sales the greater are transport
costs and trade barriers and the lower are plant-level scale economies. The
paper by Markusen and Venables (1998) move beyond Horstmann and
Markusen (1992) and Brainard (1993a) in important respects. These papers
focus almost entirely on symmetric economies, in term of country size,
factor endowments, and technologies. On the contrary, Markusen and
Venables (1998) concentrate on asymmetries among countries, in particular
analysing why direct investment is more important among countries that are
similar. The general finding of this paper is labelled by the authors
themselves “convergence hypothesis”. Multinationals become more8
important relative to trade as countries become more similar in size,
relative endowments and technologies. A very similar conclusion is reached
in the model developed by Ethier (1986), but in a substantially different
framework, as it will be illustrated below. Again in the same direction,
Markusen and Venables (1996) develop a model that suggests that
convergence of country size may not be associated with growing volumes of
intra-industry trade as indicated in previous literature, depending on the
amount of this trade possibly being displaced by multinational production.
As a consequence, the authors conclude that the world in general can benefit
from the presence of multinational and that the gains rise particularly in
countries whose factor endowment is such that, in the absence of
multinationals, they would have few national companies. Moreover,
Markusen and Venables (1996) show how the presence of multinational
firms tends to be a stabilising force, reducing the region of endowment
space from which factor mobility would induce agglomeration. All the
models of horizontal multinationals appear to be empirically particularly
relevant for investment among developed countries.
2.2.2 Vertical multinational models
In the second branch indicated by Markusen et al. (1996), multinationals are
firms that undertake geographically separate production with investment
leading to intra-firm trade as in the vertical model of Helpman (1984).
Direct extensions of the Helpman approach are developed by Helpman and
Krugman (1985), Konan (1996), and Zhang (1996). This traditional
explanation of multinational activity, that following Brainard (1997) can be
indicated as factor-proportions hypothesis, holds that firms integrate
production vertically across borders to take advantage of factor price
differences associated with different relative factor supplies. The Helpman
(1984) model uses a differentiated-products framework with multiplant
economies of scale to examine the effect of differences in relative factor
suppliers on production-location decisions. The model predicts that9
multinational firms with corporate headquarters located in one market and
a single production plant located in another market will arise to exploit
potential factor cost differentials, as long as corporate and production
activities have different factor intensities. Assuming that corporate activities
are relatively more capital intensive than production activities, when relative
factor endowments are sufficiently similar across countries that factor prices
are equalised through trade, there is no incentive for cross-border
investment, and there is two-way trade in differentiated products and one-
way trade in homogeneous products reflecting factor-proportion differences.
When relative factor supplies differ sufficiently that factor prices are not
equalised through trade, some of the firms in the differentiated sector locate
their corporate headquarters in the relatively capital-abundant economy and
their production in the relatively labour-abundant economy, and export back
to the headquarters market. Thus, with cross-border investment motivated
solely by factor-proportions differences, multinational activities only arise
in a single direction within an industry, in single-plant firms and between
economies with large factor-proportions differences. With two stages in the
production process, multinationals generate inter-industry trade and final
goods. With additional stages, multinationals may generate inter-industry
trade for both final goods and intermediates, but again flowing across border
is only one direction at each vertical stage. These models of vertical direct
investment seem more relevant in order to explain investment into
developing economies.
It is important to underline that the two explanations of multinational
activity proposed by the two branches of the literature are wholly
compatible. When both factor-proportion differences and a proximity-
concentration trade-off are combined, firms make the decision whether to
produce abroad or export, based on the relative importance of these two
considerations. The paper by Markusen et al. (1996) provides a formally
integrated treatment of the horizontal and vertical models, so that various
combinations of horizontal multinationals, vertical multinationals and10
strictly national firms can arise endogenously as a function of parameter
values. Such parameters are trade costs, differences between countries in
relative and absolute factor endowments, and investment barriers. The
authors show that vertical multinationals dominate production when the
countries differ significantly in relative endowments, but are somewhat
similar in size. Horizontal multinationals dominate when the countries are
similar in both size and in relative endowments, and when trade costs are
moderate to high. National firms dominate when trade cost are low and
relative endowments are similar, or when trade cost are moderate, relative
endowments are similar, and the countries differ significantly in size.
2.2.3 Other models
Some recent imperfect-competition models of multinationals presume that
multinational firms possess proprietary advantages, which are most
profitably exploited internally for reasons such as asymmetric information
and control over quality or technology diffusion. Main contributions in this
area are the papers by Ethier (1986), Horstmann and Markusen (1987), and
Dunning (1988). In particular, the paper by Ethier (1986) first indicates that
the question critical for understanding direct investment in the context of
trade theory is the nature of internalisation, and that the essential aspect of
the latter usually involves the exchange of information between agents. The
central informational issues are the public good nature of information and
the size and diversity of the information flows with which agents must
contend. In order to examine these concerns the author constructs a model
containing two variables, research effort and product quality, respectively,
associated with the two central informational issues. The basic parameters
of the model are the relative factor endowments and the degree of intrinsic
uncertainty facing agents
3. The implications of the model are extremely
different from those of the Markusen-Helpman-type of models, which took
internalisation for granted. In the model developed by Ethier (1986) the11
presence of multinational firms is positively related to the size of the
dispersion and to the degree of similarity in relative factor endowments.
Sufficient endowments similarity and the presence of a large enough
dispersion cause two-way direct investment, making intra-industry trade and
intrafirm trade large relative to inter-industry trade. Since it is unclear how
robust the set of result is, the important consideration that it is possible to
derive from the approach developed by the author is the inherent importance
of explicitly modelling the internalisation decision. In the spirit of the model
by Horstmann and Markusen (1987), developed making explicit use of
game theory, the papers by Smith (1987) and Motta (1992) consider the
strategic role played by FDI in oligopolistic competition. The strategic
interaction between the subsidiary of a multinational and a potential local
firm is investigated. In particular, the paper by Motta (1992), that can be
considered an extension of Smith (1987), goes beyond the standard results
of the multinationals theories in explaining the influence of the market size
and of the cost variables on the choice between FDI and export. Interactions
in rival firms’ decision are shown to be a possible criticism to the usual
conclusion that increases in the size of the host market and exporting costs
and decreases in plant-specific costs and information costs induce a shift
from export to investment. Moreover, the author indicates that the
traditional result of increasing FDI as a consequence of tariffs imposed by
the host country may also be the opposite. A tariff may induce a shift away
from the foreign investment decision.
According to Markusen (1997), the accumulation of evidence from the last
fifteen years suggests that it is important to examine more closely the
relationship between trade and direct investment, especially with respect to
the substitutes vs. complements issue. Stylised facts suggest that FDI is not
motivated primarily by trade-barrier-avoidance, and not motivated primarily
by factor-endowment/price differences. On the contrary, the basic models
previously analysed consider trade and FDI substitutes because the key
                                                                                                                                                                    
3  The degree of intrinsic uncertainty facing agents is indicated in the paper with the term12
choice is to supply a market either through exports or through local
production. In this direction, Baldwin and Ottaviano (1998) develop a
model in which two-way FDI arises due to imperfect competition and in
which intra-industry trade and intra-industry investment go hand in hand.
The model is designed thinking on an archetypal European consumer-goods
multinational producing a wide range of consumer goods
4. The decision of
the number of varieties to produce faces a trade-off between a direct effect
and a revenue-depressing effect. The direct effect indicates the operating
profit of the new variety and the revenue-depressing effect reflects the fact
that each new variety competes with the firm’s existing variety. The
reasoning proposed by the authors is based on the assumption that firms are
willing to accept a lower rate of return on new variety produced abroad, if
producing the variety abroad reduces the revenue-depressing effect.
Specifically, firms are supposed to find it optimal to produce some of their
variety abroad since trade barriers
5 partially shield home-produced varieties
from the revenue-depressing effect of foreign produced varieties, and vice
versa. Thus placing a factory abroad has a trade enhancing effect in the form
of re-imports in addition to the usual displacement of exports with local
sales of foreign affiliates. In this terms the authors provide a model in which
trade and direct investment are not substitutes.
3 FDI and European Economic Union
In the next sections, the literature on FDI related to the process of European
economic integration is analysed. Theoretical and empirical early works
built on the extension of the neoclassical theory of the international trade
and more recent works on the subject are reviewed. In particular, four
                                                                                                                                                                    
dispersion.
4  The authors have in mind multinational corporations such as Nestle or Procter & Gamble
5  Clearly this only works when trade in goods is restricted. When trade is almost free,
almost any barrier to FDI will make intra-industry FDI unprofitable. However, the authors
notice that even natural trade barriers such as transport costs and language are sufficient for
creating FDI.13
generic hypotheses suggested by Dunning (1997a) are used as basic
framework in order to introduce the major contributions of the recent
literature about the economic consequences of IMP. Before the review,
some important stylised facts are presented.
3.1 Stylised facts
Creating a unified European market has been a fundamental objective of the
Community since its very beginning in the 1950s. By the end of the 1960s,
much had already been achieved. Tariffs and quotas on intra-European trade
had been abolished, a common external tariff on imports from third
countries introduced and, in 1969, a programme introduced to remove intra-
European technical barriers
6. Following Dunning (1988), before the
constitution of the EEC, foreign direct investment was driven mainly by
defensive import substitution reasons, in order to overcome government
induced market distortions. Nevertheless, a portion of foreign investment in
Europe was already undertaken for more aggressive reasons, principally to
take advantage of lower costs and to locate nearer to the markets. After the
constitution of EEC, the consequent lowering of costs of exporting from the
home country encouraged a rationalisation of productive facilities by
European multinationals. Some intra-European direct investments were
withdrawn. At the same time, however, the reduction of transaction costs
within member states allowed others foreign firms to take advantage of
product and process specialisation by co-ordinating their activities in
separate European plants and serve a much wider market. As a consequence,
the effect on intra-European direct investment was the opposite of the first
underlined. The general effect on inward direct investment from non-EEC
countries was a diffuse promotion of the growth of such investment.14
Empirical evidence suggests that the net effect of European economic
integration has been to increase the flow of foreign investment to individual
member countries (Dunning, 1988). Following Dunning (1997a), an
examination of the FDI investment data for the period 1957-85 reveals that
foreign investment inflows in European member countries rose quite
substantially, and that investment from non-EEC countries – particularly
from the United States - represented the majority of the FDI in EEC.
Moreover, prior to 1985, around 90 percent of foreign investment inflows in
European member countries concentrated in the core countries, namely
Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and United
Kingdom.
Despite the formation of EEC, capital flows, intra-European trade in both
goods and services, and free movement of person around the Community
for work or leisure purpose continued to be restricted by numerous non-
tariff barriers. In 1985, the Internal Market Programme (IMP) was initiated
by the European Commission with the intention of eliminate all remaining
non-tariff barriers between the Member States by the mid-1990s. According
to the study by UNCTC (1993) on the effect of European integration on
transnational corporations, the programme to complete IMP carries
important implications both for the Union itself and for countries located
outside the Union producing a very complex relationship between economic
integration and multinationals. The main elements influencing this
relationship are the form of market integration undertaken, the industry
considered, and the nationality of the multinational enterprise. The impact
of European economic integration on multinationals behaviour appears,
indeed, to be in part a result of country-specific factors. Moreover, as
pointed out by Dunning (1997a), the evaluation of the impact of market
integration was strongly conditional also on the time frame of the analysis
considered.
                                                                                                                                                                    
6  Often it has been referred to this period that began in 1957 and extended until the mid-
1980s as Mark I integration. The ‘1992’ programme is often known as Mark II integration
and is reckoned from 1985 onwards.15
Consequently, the study by UNCTC (1993) concentrates on three groups of
transnational corporation making investments in the EU. First, those of one
EU country investing in another country within the union, that is intra-EU
FDI; second, those of non-EU developed-country multinationals investing in
the EU, mainly those from United States and Japan; and third, those
developing-country multinationals investing in the EU. One of the main
findings is that the rate of growth of non-EU direct investment in EU
countries has consistently outpaced that of investment by other EU
countries. During the Mark I period, United States FDI dominated inward
and intra-EU flows, and in the years leading up the Mark II period, Japanese
multinationals undertook an increasing share of non-EU investment. Some
of the reasons for these facts are identified in terms of the changing in
multinationals strategy and structure related to industry- and firm-specific
variables. The presence of economies of scale is individuated among the
more important industry-specific variables determining the extent of
corporate reorganisation in response to regional integration. Following the
data commented by European Commission (1996), an increase in the
importance of FDI stocks to the EU as a share of GDP is noticeable. While
the ratio of FDI inward stock to GDP since 1980 has generally grown
world-wile, the European Union’s has grown even faster, most markedly in
the period 1985 to 1990, and remained higher than for most developed
countries. This reflects the important role played by FDI in the EU
economy, in contrast to both the United States and, in particular, Japan, and
means that FDI is likely to have a more pronounced impact on the EU
economy than on other economies around the world, especially developed
countries. According to Norman (1995), the 1992 programme and the
general process of regional integration in the EU have been reflected in a
rapid growth in intra-EU FDI. The intra-EU FDI increased from 25 percent
of the total inward stock in 1980 to 40 percent by 1988. The study by
UNCTAD (1996) estimates that the proportion of the aggregate stock of
world FDI located in the EU – both deriving from non-EU investing firms16
and from European investing firms - have risen from 31 percent in 1985 to
39 percent by 1995. The evidence presented by Clegg (1996) is that, over
the 40-year period to the early 1990s, the phases of EU market integration
have caused the responsiveness of US FDI to market growth to be greater
for EU countries than for non-EU countries. However, statistics on new
capital outflows for 1984-91 suggest that the relative importance of US FDI
has been diminishing. There has been an overall decline in the US share
from 28 percent of EU inflows to 10 percent in 1991, passing through the
level of just 3 percent in 1988
7. In general, according to the study by OECD
(1992), FDI from OECD countries increased fourfold in the 1980s and grew
much more rapidly than domestic capital formation, GDP, or world trade.
Rugman and Verbeke (1991) point out another important feature
characterising FDI. Over half of the world’s traded output derives from the
500 world’s largest multinational enterprises, and nearly all of these are
based in the triad economies of Japan, the United states, and the European
Union.
Given to the powerful empirical relevance of the phenomenon of FDI, a
widening stream of the literature is pointing out the importance of including
multinational corporate in the analysis of economic integration. Although
capital and intermediate product flows have been incorporated into
integration analysis since early work on the subject, Dunning and Robson
(1987) underline that the manner in which they are transferred was largely
ignored by the literature of 1960s and 1970s. This reflected the
predominance of neoclassical analysis of integration assuming that firms
produce a single homogeneous good in a competitive industry and sustain
                                                                
7  The author notices that some caution is necessary in interpreting the figure depicted
because the data exclude the computation of reinvested earnings, and it is likely that the
longer-established US affiliates in the EU have been growing through reinvested earnings.
On this aspect, in particular Mayes (1985) points out the fact that with the implementation
of the IMP, although a foreign subsidiary, like all domestic companies in the foreign
country, faces increased competition from companies established in other EU countries as
tariffs are eliminated, it is likely to continue to make profit and to invest. Therefore, even if
no transfer of found takes place with the parent company, an increase in assets of this kind
has to be considered a component of FDI and therefore as part of the effect of the IMP on
FDI.17
few or no transaction cost. In this framework, economic integration was
expected to influence the location of investment and not its ownership. Only
during the last fifteen years, economists have taken interest in providing a
serviceable framework of analysis for the explanation of the activities by
multinational with the development of the new trade theory. The industrial-
organisation approach to trade has entailed a switch of the focus of attention
away from discrete acts of trade and investment to an analysis of the reason
why firms become multinational and what determines the spatial pattern of
their growth.
3.2 Limits of the early literature
The initial widespread neglect of the effect of multinational enterprises
within theoretical studies on economic integration was not paralleled in the
studies of empirical evidence and in the political economy analysis of the
issue. By the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the practical importance of the
subject was already evident, as it emerges from the literature surveyed by
Dunning and Robson (1987). The authors study the interface between
multinational enterprises and regional integration distinguishing four
principal issues that have been covered by the literature. The impact of the
formation of a grouping on the rate of inflow of FDI, the impact of
integration on the location of FDI within the region, the validity of the
orthodox integration analysis in presence of multinational enterprises, and
the policy implications of multinational corporations in regional groupings.
The article by Yannopoulos (1990a) reviews the empirical evidence of the
impact of economic integration in Europe on the size and structure of the
activities of multinational corporations in the European Union during its
formative years. More specifically it looks at the period when the original
six Member States of the European Community achieved the first stage of18
their customs union
8 by removing tariffs and quotas on their internal trade
and establishing a common external tariff on their trade with the rest of the
world. The review is then used by the author to draw some hypotheses about
the expected impact of the completion of the European customs union with
the elimination of the non-tariff barriers to intra-EU trade by 1992 on the
level and pattern of foreign direct investment in the EU. Much of the earlier
work on the impact of economic integration on FDI was concerned with an
assessment of the trend in the flows of US direct investment to the European
Community and in particular in finding out whether these trends
demonstrate any upwards deflection. This period coincided indeed with a
considerable inflows of FDI into the EC, especially from the United States:
in 1964 the value of US direct investment in the EC had more than trebled
in comparison to the year of the establishment of the Community.
According to Yannopoulos (1990a), however, it is hazardous to interpret
this trend as indicating the certain presence of a direct effect arising from
the process of European integration. It is not evident whether the
constitution of the European customs union led to a distinct alteration of the
trends that were already under way since 1950. Moreover the process of
integration coincided with several other developments that were raising the
locational advantages of the Member states, like for instance the follow-up
of German reconstruction, intensifying the ownership specific advantages in
terms of technological progress and innovative activity of the US firms, and
made possible the achievement of the indispensable internalisation
advantages represented by progress in air transport and communications in
general. The analysis by Scaperlanda and Balough (1983) provided a widely
recognised strong empirical support for the hypothesis that the formation of
the European Community and the process of economic integration had a
definite influence on the changes that occurred during the 1960s in the
locational patterns of US investment abroad.
                                                                
8  The first stage of the customs union of the EC was accomplished during the period 1957-
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The empirical work paid only limited attention to EU non-domestic direct
investment of European firms. According to Cantwell (1987) and
Yannopoulos (1990a), serious analysis of the determinants of European
direct investment in the EU has been constrained by the lack of a reliable set
of data available
9. Moreover, Dunning and Robson (1987) pointed out that
on the basis of purely  ex post statistical studies it is impossible to
disentangle the effects of economical integration from other factors. For this
reason the authors conclude that it remains essentially a matter of judgement
as to what has been the impact of integration on multinational corporations.
Cantwell (1987) suggested that an industrial case study approach seems to
be more fruitful than cross-country statistical analysis. This is indeed the
approach adopted by the author in his article focusing on the restructuring of
European industries by the multinational enterprises that operate within the
Community. The pharmaceuticals and motor vehicles sector have been
chosen in order to illustrate patterns of cumulative causation in the location
of technological activity by multinational enterprises in the United
Kingdom, as part of their European operations and strengthened by the
existence of the EC. The analysis presented reflects the view that in any
international industry there is a long-run process of cumulative advantage at
work. That is, in locations where innovation is strong, success breeds
success in the form of a virtuous circle, while countries whose firms have a
lower capacity for innovation fall further and further behind and are
gradually driven out of world markets in a vicious circle of cumulative
decline. Thus an internationally trading industry will become increasingly
divided into some dynamic and some stagnant production locations.
The work of Molle and Morsink (1991a) represents an attempt to overcome
the problem of the constraint on data availability by building up a matrix of
direct investment flows between Member States of the EU covering the
period 1975-83. Nevertheless, such data base is not useful in studying the
                                                                
9  Specifically on the problem of the weakness of national data on FDI is the article by
Vukmanic, Czinkota and Ricks (1985). In general, however, is well known in the literature20
impact of integration on FDI, being the starting data rather remote from the
date of the establishment of the European Community. One can argue,
however, that the process of integration in Europe has been an on-going
phenomenon and thus it is possible to capture the effect of this process on
FDI with the use of this data base. In fact, Molle and Morsink (1991a) used
the matrix in the framework of gravity-type models adapted from the
international trade literature. The authors combine push, pull, stimulus and
friction factors in order to offer an explanation for international flows. The
main findings of the study by Molle and Morsink are that trade results to be
an important stimulus factor for FDI within Europe and that the relation
between trade and FDI seems to be non-linear. Therefore, above a certain
level of trade intensity, intra-EC trade and intra-EC investment appear to be
complementary flows.
3.3 Improvements of the recent literature
The conclusion that trade and investment are complementary flows differs
widely from the ideas supporting the earlier work of the 1970s. This
literature was built on the extension of the neoclassical theory of the
international trade to situations involving factor mobility and trade, where
investment were implicitly considered always substitutes. A weak
interlinking between the theory of international economic integration and
the theory of international production seems to be the main cause of this
assumption, contradicted by the very fact that, despite the disappearance of
internal tariffs, FDI by European multinational firms themselves also
expanded rapidly within the Community. This is the common opinion of
many authors, expressed with particular emphasis by Dunning and Robson
(1987) and Yannopoulos (1990a). The focus of much of the earlier research
on direct investment abroad led to a one-sided orientation towards the
                                                                                                                                                                    
the problem arising from inconsistencies in national definitions of foreign direct
investment.21
locational implications of the trade-diverting effects of custom unions
ignoring the consequences of integration on the ownership and organisation
of economic activity - a question which is central to the theory of
international production. Combining the framework of the OLI paradigm
with the theory of international integration, Yannopoulos (1990a,b)
proposes an accurate classification of multinational activity in the European
Union. The author distinguishes
10 four types of investment responses by
international firms identifying the static and dynamic effects of economic
integration with the likely strategic responses of firms engaged in
international production. The first type is the defensive import-substituting
investment that derives from the trade diversion effects
11 of economic
integration. It results from locational advantage generated by tariff
realignment and represents a firm’s response to maintain its market share.
The second type is the offensive import-substituting investment to take
advantage of the opening up of the new markets and the expected expansion
in their size, and thus of the growing demand. The third type is the
reorganisation investment that results from the pressure generated by the
trade creation effects
12. It will encourage multinational firms to redistribute
production already established inside the Community towards locations with
more advantageous cost conditions in the unified European market. The last
type is the rationalised investment. It refers to investment undertaken in
order to take advantage of the effect of improved efficiency – that is mainly
the resulting new international distribution of advantageous production costs
- following the removal of intra-EC non-tariff barriers to trade. According to
the author, the deepening of the European economic integration leads to
more opportunities for reorganisation and rationalised investment. Also
offensive import-substituting investment is expected to be relatively higher.
                                                                
10  It is interesting to notice that the taxonomic scheme proposed by Yannopoulos (1990a,b)
does not depend on any prior view about the issue of substitutability or complementarity
between trade and foreign direct investment.
11  The trade diversion effect refers to the shift of the source of supply from more efficient
third countries to less efficient domestic producers and results from the relative tariff
discrimination - caused by the realignment of tariffs - versus third country exporters.22
On the contrary, defensive import-substituting investment is expected to be
relatively lower.
The conclusions reached by Yannopoulos (1990a,b) have to be regarded
within the extensive study conducted by Dunning (1997a,b) in order to
describe the specific impact of the IMP on the level and pattern of FDI in
the EU. Although the investigation of this topic, using the author’s words, is
“like doing a difficult jigsaw puzzle with many pieces missing” (Dunning,
1997b, p. 208), the two-part review article by Dunning (1997a,b) is a
complete and clarifying reference. In particular, Dunning underlines that an
analysis aiming at delineating the main economic consequences of the IMP
for extra- and intra-FDI in the EU has to be explicitly based on the
combination of trade and FDI theories. According to this, the author
identifies four generic hypotheses regarding the effects of the IMP on FDI.
On the basis of this classification, we will highlight some of the main
contributions developed by the recent literature focusing on the relation
between the IMP and FDI.
3.3.1 Intensity and direction of the effects on FDI
The first hypothesis proposed by Dunning (1997a,b) is that the IMP will
have a positive effect on intra-EU trade as a consequence of the increased
efficiency of resource allocation within the Union, and that the IMP will
have an ambivalent effect on intra-EU FDI. On the other hand, looking at
extra-EU flows, a positive effect on inward FDI and an ambivalent effect on
extra-EU trade are expected. The ratio between export and FDI flows
calculated by Dunning (1997b) is higher in intra- than in extra-EU
transactions. In the study by Buigues and Jacquemin (1994), US and
Japanese trade and FDI flows towards the EU result to be significantly
complementary to each others. Expressly about extra-EU FDI inflows after
                                                                                                                                                                    
12  The trade creation effect refers to the increase of intra-EU trade flows as a consequence
of more efficient resource allocation within the EU, in accordance with the partner
country’s comparative advantage.23
1992, is the article by Rugman and Verbeke (1991). The authors suggest
that the competitive strategies for non-EU multinational enterprises will
partly follow the strategies already underway by their current European
rivals. Moreover the authors expect that non-EU companies will establish
themselves in the Union before 1992 in order to avoid potential barriers to
entry and forced alteration of their designed strategies. Pain and Lansbury
(1997) underline that, even if decline in barriers to trade is expected to lead
to greater concentration of production in line with comparative advantage,
the initial stage of liberalisation could generate increased investment flows
as firms relocate in order to exploit the new opportunities.
Acocella (1992) analyses the relation between trade and FDI effects of IMP
within a game-theory approach. The main conclusion of author is that the
lowering of barriers threatens the monopoly positions of firms in the
countries
13 and each one of them has the incentive to remove the danger of
profits’ reduction in relation to trade by eliminating his opponent. Norman
(1995) observes that in a number of industries, in particular the technology-
intensive industries, EU multinationals and US long-established affiliates
are becoming increasingly regionalised within the Union. EU companies
appear to consider the home markets the EU as a whole, rather than their
country of origin within the EU, and many US companies
14, adopted a pan-
European view, with predominant local sourcing and highly devolved local
management structures to such an extent that it is difficult to consider them
as being other than EU firms. Given their relative youth, few of Japanese
affiliates established in the EU can be characterised by similar observations.
However, in general, the improved market accessibility resulting from the
implementation of the IMP is increasingly encouraging companies, no
matter what their original nationalities, to adopt a pan-European view.
Moreover, the author underlines the fact that the improvement in market
accessibility is an additional factor respect to any expansion of the market.
                                                                
13  The game developed by Acocella (1992) is based on the restrictive assumption – as it is
underlined by the author himself – that there are only two firms, each in one country, and
two markets. The firms earn monopoly profits before the abolition of barriers.24
Therefore, it leads to more investment in the EU than would have occurred
as a consequence solely of market growth so that the volume of investment
results greater than would have been the case without regional integration.
Following the study by OECD (1992), the observed increase of FDI flows
into European countries during the last decade, while undoubtedly related to
investors’ concern about trade barriers which might result from the IMP,
was also due to economic recovery and the new possibilities arising from
the single market. Investors were attracted by the prospect of a large unified
market, with stable exchange rates, monetary discipline, and lower costs.
This seems, in particular, the situation experienced by Spain and Portugal.
3.3.2 Effects on the geographical distribution of FDI
The second hypothesis identified by Dunning (1997a,b) is that IMP will
have an ambivalent effect on the geographical distribution of FDI within the
EU, both by EU and non-EU multinationals. Dunning (1997b) underlines
that there is little evidence of any general increase in the concentration of
FDI within the EU, even if the share of FDI inflows in the EU from the
major EU economies has increased in almost all manufacturing and service
sectors between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s. Barrell and Pain (1997)
provide empirical evidence that between 1976 and 1995 the leading
investing countries - the United Kingdom, the United States, France,
Germany and Japan - tended to invest in other OECD countries rather than
in the more capital scarce ones, as predicted by the classical explanation of
FDI in terms of relative factor endowments. The observation that key
destinations for inward investment in recent years have been countries such
as the United Kingdom, the United States, France and Belgium,
characterised by relatively high cost and relatively capital abundance,
supports the conclusion that not only poor economies in term of both capital
and income attract capital flows. Investigating the effects European
economic integration on US FDI, Clegg (1996) points out that a wide range
                                                                                                                                                                    
14  Typical examples are Ford and General Motors.25
of applied studies of FDI flows into the EU considers the role of demand as
the leading hypotheses of such flows. In particular, the role of demand
conditions in determining the location of production is analysed by looking
at the absolute size of foreign markets. The general framework behind this
approach is the idea that a large size of the market lead to transaction cost
reduction in conjunction with foreign location, and therefore that it exist a
theoretically positive relation with the level of FDI. On the contrary, Culem
(1988) demonstrate that EU market size did not attract US inward FDI -
while US market size is important for EU FDI into the United States.
However, the hypothesis on market growth overall receives qualified
support and the literature seems to conclude essentially concordant that the
enlarged market opportunities the European Union offered appear to be a
much more effective incentive than barriers to trade. It seems now evident
that market size has been leading in encouraging new entry, particularly
during the initial phase of European integration. Subsequently, market
growth has become the principal determinant of the later increase of FDI,
once most foreign subsidiary where established. For instance,
Balasubramanyam and Greenaway (1992) point out as the data on trends in
Japanese FDI strongly indicate that its level has been positively influenced
by the 1992 programme. Moreover, the role of market concentration
considerations is indicated to be particularly important. This conclusion
reflects the thesis - based especially on the industrial organisation approach
- that FDI follows trade between trade blocs in order to resolve conflict
between producers. Culem (1988) invoke the same idea to rationalise his
unexpected finding that the EU market size does not attract US inward
direct investment, although in this case the result is probably an outcome of
the maturing of foreign affiliates. In the context of the EU, indeed, there are
clear sources of instability along each of the following lines: the
enlargement of the EU; the breakdown of stability in industries arising from
over-capacity during recession; the internal de-regulation and market
liberalisation; and the external growth of non-tariff barriers. For this reason,26
the explanatory power of the hypothesis is likely to be periodic, peaking in
moments of instability, and then declining over time.
The geographical distribution of industrial activities predicted according to
the Krugman’s view (Krugman 1991, 1993) - based on the experience and
the theory of the United States - suggests that increased market integration
leads to more specialisation of economic activities. Greater industrial
specialisation results, as well, from the approach developed by Venables
(1996, 1998) based on agglomeration and cumulative causation concepts.
European integration is considered by the author to lead to a process of
agglomeration of industries because firms are likely to locate close to each
other, and no more close to the consumers. On this respect, as previously
explained, Markusen and Venables (1995, 1998) develop the “convergence
hypothesis” demonstrating that direct investment is more important among
countries that are similar in size, relative endowments and technologies.
Moreover, following Brainard (1993a) overseas production is more likely to
occur mainly the stronger are returns to scale at the firm level relative to the
plant-specific ones and the higher are transport costs. According to this,
economic integration is expected to lead to a more concentrated
geographical distribution of industries in the EU in intensive technology
sectors in which plant economies of scale relative to transport costs are
dominant. On this respect, Dunning (1997b) underlines that there is little
suggestion of any general increase in the geographical concentration of FDI
within the EU. Baldwin et al. (1995) underline the possibility that the IMP
may have served to divert investment into the EU at the expense of other
locations.
3.3.3 Country and sector specificity of the effects on FDI
The third hypothesis indicated by Dunning (1997a,b) suggests that,
depending on both country and sector specific factors, the IMP will have an
ambivalent effect on foreign ownership of activities in the EU. In particular,27
the author considers likely an increase in the foreign ownership of
production in the sectors where firm level economies of scale prevail over
plant level economies of scale. In those sectors, the IMP is likely to enable
firms to spread better the extra-plant fixed costs and to reduce the costs of
co-ordinating foreign production. This is, indeed, again the prediction of the
model developed by Brainard (1993a).
The last hypothesis, following naturally from the third one, considers the
fact that some sectors are likely to be affected more by the IMP than others.
Therefore the effects of the single market on trade and FDI will, at list to
some extent, be sector specific. Similar observations can be found in a large
number of recent works investigating the effects of European integration on
FDI, as it is expressed, among others, in the articles by Pain and Lansbury
(1997), by Yannopoulos (1990a,b), by Young (1992), and by Young et al.
(1991). Moreover, Young et al. (1991) underline that it is important to
distinguish between first-comers
15 and late-comers firms - typically the
Japanese ones - where the latter have the possibility to organise the
expansion of facilities from the beginning on an optimal European basis. In
a similar spirit, the paper by Buigues and Jacquemin (1989) illustrates that
the strategic interaction between firms in the EU after the launching of the
1992 programme has to be analysed by referring to different typologies of
sectors. The main criteria used by the authors to define the different
typologies are the advantages of being a leading firm and the opportunities
for differentiation of activity of the firm. Similarly, Clegg (1996) underlines
that firms followed different strategy in response to IMP mainly in relation
to their specific characteristic. In particular, the ownership of the firm, the
different length of time the firm had been established in the EU, and the
particular competitive position covered within the EU and globally are
identified by the author as the main elements of evaluation. Strategies
pursued by US firms under Mark I integration were initially characterised
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more years ago.28
by defensive import-substituting FDI undertaken to preserve market shares
already acquired through trade servicing of EU markets. The result was an
increase in the degree of corporate integration by US firms. During the
Mark II integration, restructuring of marketing and distribution activities
were predominant. By the end of the 80’s most EU firms - including US
affiliates - had adopted a single market in their strategic plans undertaking
large corporate restructuring. In general, unlike the case of more recent US
FDI, much intra-EU FDI represented new entry rather than expansionary
investment. Moreover the author notices that cross-border restructuring by
large firms preceded that by small and medium sized manufacturing and by
service firms. A specific pattern is displayed by FDI in the service sector,
which represents an increasing component of total FDI inflows. In this
sector, FDI follows market opportunities particularly promptly reflecting the
fact that the main characteristic of production processes in service are often
highly specific to the location of the market.
3.3.4 Other important factors behind the effects on FDI
Some other specific factors are important elements to be considered
regarding the effects of the IMP on FDI. The role of wage and other cost
factor is frequently distinguished among the key determinants of FDI.
Theory suggests that wage costs should exert a discernible effect on the
location of production
16, even if, between developed countries, other factors
can dominate in the location decision. In particular, Culem (1988) find that
intra-EU FDI is attracted to locations with higher unit labour costs than the
home countries. Moreover, in the same study, both the absolute and the
host-home differential labour cost variables result insignificant for FDI
flows in the EU from the United States as well as for EU FDI in the United
States. This could be explained by the fact that high transport costs from the
United States to the EU could dominate investment decisions, independently
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by the  common problem that relative cost variables are often based on the invalid
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from the relative advantage of labour costs. Following Clegg (1996), the
general conclusion that horizontal marked-oriented FDI between developed
economies is not significantly driven by wage costs has to be completely
accepted, the location of production being mainly related to transport costs
and the proximity to the market, including non-tariff barriers. However, the
author specifies that, within an economically integrated area, rationalised
investment is attracted to those locations characterised by the presence of
specific skills at the best value. Another important factor for the location of
FDI is linked to the effects of differing tax regimes. The impact of tax on
FDI is widely debated in the literature. However, a typical example is
generally considered by looking at the case of Ireland; a small country
where fiscal incentives had relevant effects in attracting inbound direct
investment. Sleuwaegen (1987) and Stopford (1987) underline the general
implications of European industrial practices and policies towards foreign
firms.
Among others, Rugman (1985) and Cantwell and Sanna Randaccio (1992)
shift the attention to another important aspect of international production
arising from the activity of multinational companies concentrating their focus
on intra-industry FDI. The analysis by Rugman (1985) is aimed at specifying
the determinants of intra-industry FDI and the relation between this and intra-
industry trade. The conclusion is that market imperfections, such as
economies of scale and product differentiation, drive both intra-industry FDI
and intra-industry trade, most intra-industry trade being undertaken by
multinational companies. On the same direction, the analysis by Cantwell and
Sanna Randaccio (1992) specifies that the precondition for cross investment
flows to take place is that the industry be an international oligopoly.
Moreover, the market size plays a significant role in the sense that an
expansion of two identical domestic markets leads to an increase in the
volume of intra-industry FDI.30
According to the analysis of OECD (1992), behind FDI in the 1980s a
particular combination of various factors had specific relevance. To begin
with, economic output in the OECD was generally strong after a long and
difficult period of slow growth and structural adjustments. FDI was strongly
pro-cyclical during this period, affected by macroeconomic swings and
responding during recovery with greater vigour than either domestic
investment or world trade. Also, trade and investment linkages became
more important as more firms decided to invest and then sell in foreign
markets, rather than simply export from their home base. Another factor
behind the increase in FDI during the 1980s was that more businesses in
OECD countries went international, developing links with foreign markets
and adopting global approaches in outlook, strategies, and operations.
Although this was already happening in the 1960s and 1970s, the process
accelerated during the 80s as companies were forced to look beyond their
national borders for new products, customers, and inputs. Improved
communications and transportation tied economies closer together and
enabled smaller companies to invest abroad. In addition, the massive
development of financial markets facilitated the investment process, and the
financial sector itself became the object of extensive investment activity.
Moreover, broad improvements in macroeconomic performance and
structural reforms in OECD countries created an attractive environment for
international investors to plan and invest in the 1980s. The financial
discipline associated with the removal of exchange controls in the OECD
countries increased predictability and enhanced investor confidence.
Exchange liberalisation was part of the structural reform OECD countries
went through in the 1980s, and was fundamental to boosting capital flows
between countries. The observation by Dunning (1995) that the activity of
multinational enterprises go hand in hand with globalisation and deep
economic integration reflects, indeed, one of the most important issue
concerning the role of FDI at the end of twentieth century.31
4 FDI and European Monetary Union
The possibility of negative consequences of variable exchange rates was one
motivating theme in developing the Exchange Rate Mechanism within the
European Monetary System. In particular, the role of exchange rate
variability appears to be important in determining domestic and foreign
investment flows. The impact on FDI of exchange rate stability, that follows
from the creation of the European Monetary Union is, therefore, an
interesting element to be considered in the analysis of the effects of
economic integration on foreign investment. The literature on this subject is,
however, still quite scarce. On the contrary, a great deal of literature
concentrated on the impact of exchange rate variability on trade flows, and
in particular on trade flows within the European Union.
4.1 The literature on FDI and monetary union
The effect of monetary union on FDI flows is the main hypothesis tested by
Molle and Morsink (1991b). However this seems to be the only study that
specifically considers the relation between foreign investment and monetary
union. In a previous empirical analysis of the same issue (Molle and
Morsink, 1991a), the authors concluded that exchange rate risk discourages
direct investment abroad. Moreover, the EMU, by reducing the variability of
exchange rates, was expected to increase the flows from the richer northern
Member States to those in the south. The subsequent study by Molle and
Morsink (1991b) analyses more in detail the empirical relation between FDI
within the European Union and the variability in exchange rates. For the
analysis, alike in the previous article, a gravity-model is used that takes up
as explanatory variables a number of push, pull, stimulus and friction
factors. The exchange rate variability is considered among the last group.
The results of the estimation procedures, for the years covering the period
from 1975 to 1984, show the importance of tree variables for explaining32
FDI flows. Research and development in the country of origin is identified
as the most significant push factor. Trade is identified as an important
stimulus for direct investment, indicating a considerable complementary
relation between trade and FDI. The variability in the average monthly real
bilateral exchange rates appears to be the most important friction factor, and
distance and cultural difference result as additional frictions. The conclusion
reached by the authors is again that variability in exchange rates is of
significant importance for direct investment flows. Consequently, monetary
integration is likely to stimulate FDI between the countries joining the
EMU. Aizenman (1992) analyses the implications of different exchange rate
regimes on the patterns of domestic investment and foreign direct
investment. The author demonstrates that a fixed exchange rate regime is
more conductive to FDI than a flexible exchange rate. The conclusion
reached by the author is based on the analysis of the incidence of real and
nominal shocks, both being associated with higher domestic and foreign
investment in a fixed exchange rate regime. On the contrary, Goldberg and
Kolstad (1995) argue that exchange rate volatility stimulates the share of
investment activity located abroad when there is risk aversion among
producers. The authors support the theoretical result analysing two-way US
bilateral FDI flows for the period 1978-1991.
Unlike the limited attention paid by the theoretical and empirical literature
on the effect of exchange rate variability on FDI flows, a great deal of
literature investigated the impact of exchange rate variability on trade.
Exchange rate variability has generally been considered a remarkable
limitation of the flexible exchange rate regime, since it increases the
uncertainty underlying international trade and financial transactions
17.
However, both in the short and long run, the empirical literature found very
little evidence of a negative impact of short term volatility on international
trade. On the contrary, in the empirical literature there seems to be a
consensus on the presence of a negative effect of long term movements on33
trade. According to Bini-Smaghi (1991), the empirical results obtained in
the literature appear to be contradictory and tend to highlight that there is no
systematic significant relationship between exchange rate variability and
trade flows. However, within this literature the studies that concentrated the
analysis on EU trade flows
18, found, on the whole, evidence that exchange
rate variability negatively affects bilateral flows.
4.2 The literature on FDI and exchange rate
On the general connection between FDI and exchange rate is the paper by
Froot and Stein (1991). Froot and Stein analyse the empirical evidence of
the striking inverse relationship between detrended inflows of FDI into the
United States in the period 1973-88 and the real value of the dollar, arguing
that exchange rate effects appear to be pervasive. This observation,
however, diverges quite substantially from the conclusion reached by most
international economists dismissing the possibility of a relationship between
foreign acquisitions and exchange rate on the basis that, with highly mobile
capital, risk-adjusted expected returns on all international assets will be
equalised. A model with perfect capital mobility implies that the individual
components of the capital account are not linked to the exchange rate, even
if, obviously, total net foreign investment is strictly connected with the
current balance. It is in fact necessary to import exactly enough capital to
compensate a current account deficit. However, the specific composition of
the capital account surplus is not affected by the exchange rate. In keeping
with this view, the consensus in the academic literature on FDI since the
seminal early work of Hymer (1976) has been that industrial-organisation
considerations rather than costs of capital explain most. FDI is undertaken
not because of cost-of-capital differences, but because particular domestic
assets are worth more under foreign control. Both domestic and foreign
                                                                                                                                                                    
17  See, for example, De Grauwe (1994) and European Commission (1995) for an overview
on exchange rate uncertainty and trade in the process of European integration.34
investors, having access to the same international capital market, finance
their acquisition under the same conditions. Therefore there is no role for
the exchange rate. Accordingly, Graham and Krugman (1989) argue that
FDI is essentially a means to extend control for reasons of corporate
strategy, rather than a channel for shifting resources from one country to
another. In this sense, the “investment” component of FDI is actually the
least important part of this issue. Investors simply pursuing higher returns
can concentrate on portfolio investments in securities rather than on the
more complex route of direct investment, so that the cost-of-capital view
fails to explain why the direct rather than the portfolio strategy should be
chosen. Moreover, FDI among advanced countries proceeds in both
directions, sometimes in the same industry. This is difficult to account for if
differences in the cost of capital are the reason for FDI.
Nevertheless, the experience of the United States during 1980s had given
new life to the cost-of-capital approach, given the natural suspicion that the
growth of FDI in the United States is tied to the same factors that have led
to a growth in US indebtedness. Following again Graham and Krugman
(1989), the cost-of-capital view offers a possible link between the United
States’ shift to debtor status and the rise of FDI. A decline in savings and a
perceived rise in investment opportunities generally lead to an increase in
the cost of capital relative to that abroad. The same divergence would
presumably occur in the firm-specific cost of capital between domestic and
foreign firms. Thus foreign firms would be willing to bid more for US
assets, and the rise in foreign participation would be linked to the US
current account. However the author argues that the evidence, when looked
carefully, suggests that the industrial-organisation motivation dominate the
cost-of-capital motive. This implies that the apparent coincidence of rising
FDI and growing debt in the 1980s can be considered simply a coincidence,
and that the future growth of FDI may have little to do with the US balance
of payments.
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Froot and Stein (1991) develop a formal model of FDI in order to explain
the importance of exchange rate for direct investment. The model is based
on the presence of informational asymmetries about an asset’s payoff; hence
it is related to the nature of the asset being purchased. By considering that
there is a link between wealth positions and investment, the relationship
between exchange rates and FDI follows immediately given that foreigners
hold more of their wealth in non-domestic denominated form. Therefore, a
depreciation of the domestic currency increases the relative wealth position
of foreigners and hence lowers their relative cost of capital allowing them to
bid more aggressively for assets. The conclusions of the authors are that
exchange rate effects on US FDI appear to be pervasive, even when
disaggregated to the level of individual industries and types of direct
investments. Moreover, the correlation of FDI with exchange rate results
very different from that observed for other forms of capital inflows,
including passive portfolio investment. The model developed by Froot and
Stein supports popular claims that a depreciated currency can induce
foreigners to take the control of domestic productive corporate assets.
Moreover, the model formally and empirically demonstrates that the
exchange rate adds some explanatory power to the experience of FDI
inflows into the United States. More recently, Blonigen (1997) develops a
theoretical connection between exchange rate movements and acquisition
FDI, provided that acquisitions involve firm-specific assets and good-
market imperfections prevent investors from having equal access to all
markets. The empirical evidence investigated by the author considering the
Japanese acquisitions in the United States from 1975 to 1992, shows a
strong correlation between periods of a weaker dollar and higher levels of
Japanese acquisition FDI in the United States for industries which more
likely involve firm-specific assets. However, Klein and Rosengreen (1992)
observe that the conclusions proposed by Froot and Stein (1991) that there
is a significant correlation between currency movement and US FDI can be
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questioned because the correlations calculated are also consistent with the
role that relative labour cost may play in determining FDI. At the same time,
however the authors underline that the use of the wage variable for the
determination of FDI can represent a proxy for relative wealth. In fact,
exchange rate movements have been largely responsible for both relative
wage and relative wealth movement between the United States and other
industrial countries over the floating exchange rate period. The focus of the
paper by Klein and Rosengreen (1992) is an investigation of the relationship
between United States FDI from seven industrial countries between 1979
and 1991 and the respective bilateral dollar exchange rate. The central
hypothesis is whether relative wage cost and relative wealth have had a
significant effect on US FDI. The empirical results support the significance
of the relative wealth hypothesis and fail to support the cost-of-labour
hypothesis. It is important to notice that the evidence presented by the
authors does not, by itself, support a particular theory of the manner in
which relative wealth determines FDI. Relative wealth may matter because
of the presence of imperfect capital markets, as in the theoretical model of
Froot and Stein (1991), but it is also consistent with country-specific
productivity shocks that affect both the relative wealth of a country and the
amount of FDI undertaken by its investors. The hypothesis that a weaker
real exchange rate leads to an increase in the inflow of foreign investment
and, conversely, a stronger real exchange rate diminishes FDI inflows is
consistent with both theories. Another possible source of the relationship
between the real exchange rate and foreign investment is that FDI represents
tariff-jumping and that the threat of protectionism rises with a stronger
currency. This predicts, however, a decrease in the amount of inward direct
investment in the face of a weaker real exchange rate. A reflection on the
position of the Euro as new currency in the world economy seems, for these
reasons, an important element to evaluate the effect of monetary union on
FDI in Europe.37
5 Conclusion
The economic literature on FDI and multinational corporations is very
diffuse. Within the context of this vast literature, this paper focuses on early
and recent studies that analyse possible links between FDI and the European
Economic and Monetary Union.
The OLI paradigm and the new trade theory are the general framework for
most of the theoretical and empirical literature on multinational firms. The
main finding of the recent works on the subject is that trade and investment
are complementary flows. Two branches of the literature can be principally
identified, one extending the model of horizontal multinational corporations
first developed by Markusen (1984) and the other extending the vertical
model first developed by Helpman (1984).
The conclusion that trade and investment are complementary flows is
particularly important also in the literature on FDI related to the process of
European economic integration. The evidence for EU FDI flows is indeed
strong. The main stylised fact is that, despite the disappearance of internal
tariffs and the consequent increase in trade, FDI by European transnational
enterprises expanded rapidly within the Union. Combining the framework
of the OLI paradigm with the theory of international integration,
Yannopoulos (1990a,b) proposes a useful classification of the effects of
economic integration on multinational activity. Defensive import-
substituting investment and offensive import-substituting investment are
likely to be the strategic responses of firms engaged in international
production in the EU. Furthermore, reorganisation investment and
rationalised investment are as well likely to arise. Moreover, four generic
hypotheses suggested by trade and FDI literature are identified by Dunning
(1997a,b) in order to analyse the effects of the IMP on extra- and intra-FDI
in the EU. The intensity and the direction of the effects of the IMP on FDI
flows are the first concepts analysed. On this issue, the literature develops38
different approaches, but the common conclusion is that the IMP will have
a positive effect on FDI inflows in the EU. Second, the IMP is in general
expected to have an ambivalent effect on the geographical distribution of
international production, mainly depending on the importance of plant
economies of scale in relation to the level of transport costs in the industries.
Finally, the effect of the IMP on FDI in the EU is likely to be country and
sector specific.
The creation of the European Monetary Union and the consequent exchange
rate stability are important factors behind FDI flows. However, within the
literature on the general connection between FDI and exchange rate, the
works by Molle and Morsink (1991a,b) are the only studies that specifically
consider the relation between foreign investment and European Monetary
Union. The authors conclude that monetary integration is likely to stimulate
FDI between countries joining the EMU.39
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